Abstract. We develop positive model theory, which is a non first order analogue of classical model theory where compactness is kept at the expense of negation. The analogue of a first order theory in this framework is a compact abstract theory: several equivalent yet conceptually different presentations of this notion are given. We prove in particular that Banach and Hilbert spaces are compact abstract theories, and in fact very well-behaved as such.
Introduction
Trying to extend the classical model-theoretical techniques beyond the strictly firstorder context seems to be a popular trend these days. In [Hru97] , Hrushovski defines Robinson theories, namely universal theories whose class of models has the amalgamation property. He subsequently works in the category of its existentially closed models, which serves as an analogue of the first order model completion when this does not exist. In [Pil00] , Pillay generalises this to the category of existentially closed models of any universal theory. In both cases, one works rather in an existentially universal domain for the category, which replaces the monster model of first order theories.
The present work started independently of the latter, trying to use ideas in the former in order to define a model-theoretic framework where hyperimaginary elements could be adjoined as parameters to the language, the same way we used to do it with real and imaginary ones since the dawn of time: as the type-space of a hyperimaginary sort is not totally disconnected, we need a concept of a theory who just can't say "no". In the terminology of [Hru97] , this means we must no longer require the set of basic formulas ∆ to be closed for boolean combinations, but only for positive ones. The notions of positive model theory, and in particular of positive Robinson theories, follow.
As it turns out, positive Robinson theories are but one of several alternative presentations of the same concept. We prefer therefore to make the distinction between any particular presentation and the fundamental concept itself, which we call compact abstract theories, or cats.
In the present paper we restrict ourselves to the development of the framework. General model theoretic tools, and in particular simplicity, are developed for it in [Ben02b] . Additional results, and in particular a better treatment of simplicity under the additional hypothesis of thickness, are given in [Ben02c] . These tools are applied in [Ben02a] for the treatment of the theory of lovely pairs of models of a simple theory in case that the theory of pairs is not of first order. It was pointed out that the definition of a universal domain for a positive Robinson theory is similar to Assumption III from [She75, Section 2].
Introduction to positive model theory
We introduce positive model theory, which in particular generalises first order model theory. Although it is related to classical first order logic, its development requires a radical change in our point of view: we use at times the language of categories more than that of logic, and the usage of negation and of the universal quantifier is discouraged (not to mention unnecessary).
The basic idea is to replace the notions of elementary extensions and embeddings by that of homomorphisms: for a designated set of "positive" statements, what was true for the domain must be true for its image, but not necessarily the converse. In other words, any positive statement that's true is already decided, whereas those which are not true will not necessarily remain so: they are simply "deferred" for a later decision.
This fact, of being allowed to decide only what we want and defer everything else makes the compactness theorem almost trivial: a short and elegant proof is given below as a corollary of positive Morleyisation (which is, on the other hand, more complicated than first-order Morleyisation).
Due to this shift in point of view and language, and with an easy proof of the compactness theorem, an exposition from scratch seems reasonable, and would make this paper very much self-contained.
1.1. Language and categories of structures. We start with the basic definitions: Definition 1.1. 1. A (relational) signature L is a set along with a function ν : L → ω. An element P ∈ L is called a ν(P )-ary predicate symbol. We also have a distinguished binary predicate symbol =∈ L. 2. Let L be a signature. A L-structure is a set M along with a ν(P )-ary predicate P M ⊆ M ν(P ) for every predicate symbol P ∈ L, called the interpretation of P in M . The symbol = is always interpreted by equality. Remark 1.2. Classically one also allows function symbols: however, as a function can be represented just as well by the predicate defining its graph, this is not necessary and would only serve to complicate things. Definition 1.3. Let X = {x i : i < ω} (where all the x i are distinct) and call its elements variables. In fact, we could have simply taken X = ω, but we follow traditional notation. We differ somewhat from the standard definitions in the fact that we consider the set of free variables of a formula (including the dummy ones) a part of the information in the formula: for us a L-formula is something of the form ϕ(x ∈I ) for some finite I ⊆ ω, where x ∈I is shorthand for {x i : i ∈ I}. If I = n then we write x <n . We are going to define formulas by induction, and for each formula ϕ(x ∈I ) and Lstructure M define the set ϕ(M I ) ⊆ M I . For a ∈I ∈ M I , M |= ϕ(a ∈I ) is synonymous with a ∈I ∈ ϕ(M I ).
1. If P is a n-ary symbol, then P (x <n ) is an atomic formula, and P (M n ) = P M , whereby M |= P (a <n ) ⇐⇒ a <n ∈ P M .
If ϕ(x ∈I
is a formula, J ⊆ ω is finite, and f : I → J is a map, then ψ(x ∈J ) = f * (ϕ(x ∈I )) is a formula obtained by change of variables: For a ∈J ∈ M J , write f * (a ∈J ) = (a f (i) : i ∈ I) ∈ M J , and for a set A ⊆ M I define f * (A) = f * −1 (A) ⊆ M J : then ψ(M J ) = f * (ϕ(M I )), whereby M |= ψ(a ∈J ) ⇐⇒ M |= ϕ(f * (a ∈J )). In actual notation, we may write f * (ϕ) as ϕ(x f (0) , . . . , x f (n−1) ), but it must be understood that this is a formula in the variables x ∈J . 3. If k < ω and ϕ i (x ∈I ) is a formula for every i < k, then χ(x ∈I ) = i<k ϕ i (x ∈I ) and ρ(x ∈I ) = i<k ϕ i (x ∈I ) are formulas constructed by positive (boolean) combinations: conjunction and disjunction, respectively. We define χ(M I ) = i<k ϕ i (M I ) and ρ(M I ) = i<k ϕ i (M I ). We sometimes denote the empty conjunction by and the empty disjunction by ⊥. 4. If I ∩ J = ∅ and ϕ(x I∪J ) = ϕ(x ∈I , x ∈J ) is a formula then ψ(x ∈I ) = ∃x ∈J ϕ(x ∈I , x ∈J ) is a formula constructed by existential quantification, and ψ(M I ) is the projection of ϕ(M I × M J ) on M I , whereby M |= ψ(a ∈I ) if and only if there is a ∈J ∈ M J such that M |= ϕ(a ∈I , a ∈J ). 5. If ϕ(x ∈I ) is a formula, then ψ(x ∈I ) = ¬ϕ(x ∈I ) is a formula constructed by negation, and ψ(
A formula ϕ(x ∈I ) is I-ary, and the variables x ∈I are its free variables. A 0-ary formula, that is without free variables, is called a sentence, or a closed formula.
A sub-formula of ϕ is any formula appearing along its construction. L ω,ω is the set of all L-formulas.
Notation 1.4. If the set of free variables of a formula is clear from the context or is irrelevant, we just write ϕ(x), ϕ(x) or even ϕ. Also, we may writeā ∈ M or even a ∈ M , when it is clear that these are tuples in M
I
where I is clear from the context, and we may similarly replace ϕ(M I ) with ϕ(M ).
Definition 1.5. Two I-ary formulas ϕ and ψ are equivalent if ϕ(M I ) = ψ(M I ) for every L-structure M . Convention 1.6. We consider equivalent formulas as equal. Definition 1.7. An almost atomic formula is a change of variables on an atomic formula.
Lemma 1.8. Every formula is equivalent to one constructed from almost atomic formulas along the same construction tree without any further changes of variables (beyond the almost atomic formulas).
Proof. Easy. qed Definition 1.9. 1. A set ∆ ⊆ L ω,ω is a positive fragment of L if it contains all the atomic formulas in L ω,ω and is closed under change of variables, sub-formulas, and positive combinations. 2. Let ∆ be a positive fragment. Then Σ(∆) is its closure under existential quantification, and Π(∆) = {¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Σ(∆)}.
3. The minimal positive fragment, which consists of positive combinations of almost atomic formulas (or, in a more traditional terminology, quantifier-free positive formulas), is noted ∆ 0 . We also note Σ 1 = Σ(∆ 0 ), Π 1 = Π(∆ 0 ). 4. Let ∆ be a positive fragment. Then a map f : M → N between two L-structures is a ∆-homomorphism if M |= ϕ(a) =⇒ N |= ϕ(f (a)) for every n < ω, n-ary formula ϕ(x <n ) ∈ ∆, and a ∈ M n . 5. A map f : M → N between two L-structures is a ∆-embedding if M |= ϕ(a) ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ(f (a)) for every n < ω, n-ary formula ϕ(x <n ) ∈ ∆, and a ∈ M n . 6. The category of L-structure where the morphisms are the ∆-homomorphisms is noted M ∆ . If the positive fragment ∆ is clear from the context, we omit it. Convention 1.10. When M ∆ is clear from the context and f : M → N is a morphism, then we say that N continues M . When f is clear from the context, and it is also clear that we work in N , we may sometimes omit f , identifying elements of M with their images in N . This is convenient but requires attention, as f is not necessarily injective! Remark 1.11. If ∆ is a positive fragment, then so is Σ(∆) (since we only consider formulas up to equivalence). Moreover, replacing ∆ with Σ(∆) does not change any of Σ(∆), Π(∆), or the notion of ∆-homomorphism (which is always a Σ(∆)-homomorphism). However, it may well change the notion of a ∆-embedding, which is why we consider this an unnatural notion (see also below).
The motivation is straightforward: first of all, given the definition of an L-structure, the natural notion of morphism is that of a map that preserves the truth (though not necessarily falsehood) of every predicate, that is every atomic formula. Clearly, if a map preserves the truth of a set of formulas it does so for every formula obtained thereof by positive combinations and change of variables, so we may pass to the generated positive fragment. We get the notion of a ∆ 0 -homomorphism and the category M ∆ 0 , where indeed we shall work most of the time.
In fact, one sees easily that for every positive fragment ∆, a ∆-homomorphism preserves the truth of every formula in Σ(∆), so we can add any such formula to ∆ and pass to the generated positive fragment without changing M ∆ .
However, one may also desire (weird as it may seem) not only to preserve the truth of some ϕ ∈ ∆, but its falsehood as well, which means to preserve ¬ϕ. Adding ¬ϕ to ∆ and passing to the generated positive fragment would have precisely this effect. Doing this repeatedly (possibly an infinite number of times) we obtain any category M ∆ , and at the very end we find M Lω,ω , where first order model theory takes place.
We see from this that the addition to ∆ of formulas constructed by negation is the only one that does not come for free, which is why we try to avoid negations. This stands in contrast to the classical exposition of model theory, where one considers ∆-embeddings rather than ∆-homomorphisms, and then it is quantification that does not come for free. Nevertheless, even in our context the truth of a Σ(∆)-formula is slightly more complicated to verify than that of a ∆-formula, in particular when ∆ = ∆ 0 , which is why we keep the distinction between the two: we aim to show later on that in certain cases ∆ and Σ(∆) have the same power of expression, and then restrict ourselves to ∆. Convention 1.12. ∆ is a positive fragment, and a morphism is one of M ∆ , that is a ∆-homomorphism. Definition 1.13. Let (I, ≤) be a directed partial order, and (M i : i ∈ I) a ∆ 0 -inductive system indexed by I: for every i ≤ j we have a ∆ 0 -homomorphism f ij :
− → M i as sets, with maps g i : M i → N . For R ∈ L, we define N |= R(ā) if and only if there is i ∈ I and b ∈ M i such that M i |= R(b) andā = g i (b). We note lim − → M i = N , now as L-structures. Lemma 1.14. With the notations of Definition 1.13, if ∆ is a positive fragment and
Proof. For atomic formulas, this was the definition. We can now use the fact that a positive fragment is closed for sub-formulas and work by induction on ϕ ∈ ∆. Positive combinations and existential quantifiers are easy. As for negation, assume that ¬ϕ(x) ∈ ∆ and lim − → M i |= ¬ϕ(ā). Then there are i ∈ I andb ∈ M i such that g i (b) =ā, and then necessarily
and M k |= ¬ϕ(ā) (here we finally use the fact that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆), contradiction. qed
And we conclude:
Proposition 1.15. With the notations of Definition 1.13, if ∆ is a positive fragment and (M i ) ∆-inductive system, then every g i is a ∆-homomorphism, and lim − → M i is the injective limit in the sense of M ∆ .
Let us imagine once more we walk along M ∆ . At some point we stand at the structure M , and we ask ourselves whether ϕ(a) holds, where ϕ ∈ Σ(∆) and a ∈ M . Assume indeed that M |= ϕ(a): if we follow a morphism f : M → N , then N |= ϕ(f (a)). If we follow several morphisms one after the other this is still true, and by Proposition 1.15 we can even pass to the limit of a chain of morphisms. On the other hand, if M |= ϕ(a), we do not have a definitive answer yet on what will happen when we follow a morphism (unless ¬ϕ ∈ ∆, of course), so we have to continue and see what happens. However, we shouldn't go too far either: for example, if ∆ = ∆ 0 , we may end up in a structure where everything is true, in particular equality, so the structure would be reduced to a single point! This means we need some means to give definitive negative answers, without using negations. For example, by restricting ourselves to those structures where two certain positive statements cannot be true simultaneously: then saying that one is true is a definitive decision for the falsehood of the other. This leads us quite naturally to the notion of a Π-theory. Definition 1.16. A (Π-)theory is a set of Π-sentences, that is a set of statements of the form "for no tupleā do we have ϕ(ā)", for certain formulas ϕ ∈ ∆. If M is a structure then Th Π (M ) it its theory, that is the set of all Π-sentences true in M . If M is a class of structures, then Th
A model of a theory T is a structure M |= T , meaning M |= ϕ for every ϕ ∈ T . Two theories are equivalent if they have the same models. Definition 1.17. If T is a theory (that is, a Π-theory), then M 0 (T ) is the (full) sub-category of M ∆ whose objects are models of T .
Given a theory T we can give definitive positive answers, which may also imply definitive negative answers for other questions. It makes sense now to look for a model of T where every reasonable question has a definitive answer.
In other words, we require that for every ϕ(x) ∈ Σ(∆) and everyā
The category of e.c. models of T is noted M(T ).
Assume that M, N ∈ M(T ), f : M → N is a morphism,ā ∈ M is some tuple, and ϕ(x) ∈ Σ(∆). Then, by definition, M |= ϕ(ā) ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ(f (ā)). But then, if f is actually an inclusion, then we can write rather M |= ϕ(ā) ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ(ā). This justifies:
, then by slight abuse of notation we write |= ϕ(ā) orā |= ϕ instead of M |= ϕ(a).
Next step is to show that enough e.c. models exist: Lemma 1.20. Every M |= T continues to some e.c. model N ∈ M(T ).
Remark 1.21. Lemma 1.20 is easily seen to be equivalent to the Axiom of Choice.
1.2. Positive Morleyisation and compactness. Positive Morleyisation is a an adaptation to positive model theory of a first order construction of Michael Morley, which allows us to reduce the case of a general positive fragment to that of ∆ 0 . It requires more work than in the first order case, but then it is more powerful: for example, the compactness theorem follows as a trivial corollary.
Definition 1.22. Let I be any set of indices, and {x i : i ∈ I ω} new distinct symbols.
For an n-ary formula ϕ(x <n ) and a map f : n → I we define a generalised I-ary formula ψ(x ∈I ) = f * (ϕ), again by change of variables:
). Note that this can only be a last step in the construction of a formula. When we say I-ary formula for an infinite I, it is understood we mean generalised. Convention 1.23. When we say that a generalised I-ary formula ϕ(x ∈I ) is in ∆, we mean that it is obtained from some ψ ∈ ∆ by a change of variables.
Moreover, in what follows we are going to consider change of variables as done implicitly every time we consider formulas in different tuples of variables, provided that there are indeed obvious changes of variables that would make them all formulas in the same tuple (this is after all the common practice with the standard notation for formulas). Definition 1.24. A (partial I-ary) ∆-type is a set p(x ∈I ) of formulas ϕ(x ∈I ) ∈ ∆. If p(x i∈I ) is such, and T a theory, then p is consistent with T if there is a model
If T is clear from the context, we just say that p is consistent.
We start by studying the easy case where ∆ = ∆ 0 . We recall the notation
Lemma 1.25. Let T be a Π 1 -theory, and Φ(x ∈I ) a set of almost atomic I-ary formulas, with I possibly infinite. If every finite subset Φ 0 ⊆ Φ is consistent with T (in fact, it suffices that it be consistent with each ψ ∈ T ), then Φ is consistent with T .
Proof. Take M 0 = {a i : i ∈ I} where these are all distinct elements, and define ∼ as the equivalence relation generated by {a i ∼ a j : x i = x j ∈ Φ}. Take M = M/divsim, and for every n-ary predicate symbol R take
Assume that there is ψ ∈ T such that M |= ψ. This means that there is something true in M that ψ forbids, and it is true in M due to a finite part Φ 0 ⊆ Φ. This means that Φ 0 is inconsistent with T , and in fact with ψ, contradicting the hypothesis. qed
We wish to make the notion of a definitive negative negation more explicit in some special case: Lemma 1.26. Let T be a Π 1 -theory, and assume that T is closed for logical consequence: any Π 1 sentence which is true in every model of T is in T . Let M |= T be e.c., R an n + k-ary predicate symbol, andā ∈ M n . Then M |= ∃ȳ R(x <n ,ȳ) (|ȳ| = k) if and only if there are m < ω, a tupleb ∈ M m , a map f : n → m and ϕ(x <m ) ∈ ∆ 0 such thatā = f * (b), M |= ϕ(b), and some ψ ∈ T is inconsistent with ϕ(x <m ) ∧ R(f * (x <m ),ȳ). We say then that according to T , the instance ϕ(b) (of ϕ(x)) forbids R(ā,ȳ).
Proof. One direction is clear, since M |= T . For the other, enumerate M = {b i : i ∈ I}, and let f : n → I be such thatā = f * (b). Set
is consistent with T , say satisfied byb ,c in a model M , then the map sendinḡ b tob is a ∆ 0 -homomorphism of M into M . Since then M |= R(f * (b ),c) and M is e.c., we must have also M |= ∃ȳ R(f
Therefore Φ is inconsistent with T , and by Lemma 1.25 there is a finite Φ 0 ⊆ Φ which is inconsistent with some ψ ∈ T . Write Φ 0 (x,ȳ) = Φ 0 (x) ∪ {R(f * (x),ȳ)}. Since Φ 0 is finite it is equivalent to ϕ(x ∈J ) (with the implicit change of variables) where ϕ ∈ ∆ 0 is a conjunction of almost atomic formulas and J ⊆ I is finite such that m ∈J enumerates every element ofā (that is, J contains the image of f ). Then ψ ∈ T is inconsistent with ϕ(x ∈J ) ∧ R(f * (x ∈J ),ȳ) and M |= ϕ(b ∈J ), as required. qed Definition 1.27. Let L be a given signature, and ∆ a positive fragment. Define L QE(∆) = L ∪ {R ϕ : n ∈ ω, ϕ(x <n ) ∈ ∆}, where each R ϕ is a new n-ary symbol, and ∆
is a fully faithful functor.
)-theory of the class of all the L QE(∆) -structures M which are, as L-structures, e.c. models of T , and in addition interpret each R ϕ as ϕ.
Lemma 1.30. Let ∆ be a positive fragment, and ∆
Proof. Let M ∈ M(T ). Then we know that M QE(∆) |= T , and we need to show that M QE(∆) is e.c. as such. So let N |= T and f :
homomorphism, and we need to show that is it a Σ
-embedding as required:
In order to show that it is an isomorphism, we still need to show that every M ∈ M(T ) is in the image. We
, so we only need to prove that M L ∈ M(T ), with the same argument: let N be a model of T and f : M L → N a ∆-homomorphism. In order to show that f is a Σ(∆)-embedding, we may assume that N is e.c., whereby
-homomorphism, whereby it is a Σ QE(∆) 1 -embedding and f is a Σ(∆)-embedding.
qed
Proof. We prove by induction on the structure of a formula ϕ ∈ ∆, that M |= ϕ(ā) ⇐⇒ M |= R ϕ (ā) for anyā ∈ M (of the right length) applying Lemma 1.26 to T QE(∆) . Of course, since we made no particular assumptions about T beyond its being a Π(∆)-theory, we do not know exactly what T QE(∆) would forbid. However, since
, we know that T QE(∆) forbids something if and only if it never happens in M QE(∆) (T ), and then we use what we know about the interpretation of R ϕ in M QE(∆) (T ):
, an instance of a formula forbids ϕ(ā) if and only if it forbids R ϕ (ā). Thus ϕ(ā) and R ϕ (ā) are true of false together.
If k = 0, nothing can forbid R ϕ , so we may assume that k > 0. Then an instance of a formula forbidding and
On the other, every instance which forbids R ϕ (ā) forbids every instance which forbids R ψ (ā), so precisely one of the two must be true. qed
and that modulo the translation between ∆ and L QE(∆) , everything forbidden by T must be forbidden by T QE(∆) as well. Now apply Lemma 1.30. qed
And conversely:
Proposition 1.33. Let ∆ be a positive fragment, and T a Π
by assumption. Then by Lemma 1.30 and Proposition 1.32:
). It is easy to see that if two Π
QE(∆) 1
-theories have the same e.c. models then they have the same models.
Proposition 1.32 tells us that working in M(T ) is equivalent to working in
) is always very simple, as is shown for example by the easy proof of Lemma 1.25. But then we see the power of Proposition 1.32 which allows us to reduce the general case to the ∆ 0 one:
⊆ Φ QE is consistent with T QE , thus by Lemma 1.25 it is satisfied by some tupleā in a model M |= T QE . By Lemma 1.20, there exists an e.c. model N |= T QE and a morphism f :
As a last remark, if ∆ = L ω,ω , then every structure is e.c. (as a model of any theory for which it is indeed a model). Thus first order model theory is a special case of positive model theory. We want to give a full description of tuples in models of T . We obtain equivalent definitions:
I , and Ξ a positive fragment which is not necessarily equal to ∆: it will usually be either ∆ or Σ. Then the Ξ-type of
, and not its ∆-type! (at least for the time being).
In the same manner that we may write |= ϕ(a) instead of M |= ϕ(a), we may omit the model M : if f : M → N is an inclusion morphism between two e.c. models and
Lemma 1.37. Let I be a set of indices, and M i ∈ M, a i ∈ M I for i < 2. Then the following are equivalent:
1. There is N ∈ M and morphisms f i :
, by e.c.. 2 =⇒ 3: Clear.
Since each p i is closed for finite conjunctions and tp
, we see that Φ is finitely satisfiable in M 1 , and therefore is consistent with T by the compactness theorem. Let it be satisfied in N |= T , say by c ∈J 0 ∪J 1 . We may assume that N is e.c., that is N ∈ M. Let f i : M i → N be defined by f i (b ∈J i ) = c ∈J i , and then f 0 (a 0 ) = f 1 (a 1 ) as required.
qed Definition 1.38. Let I be a set of indices, and let
As we did for the definition of types, let Ξ be a positive fragment contained in Σ, usually either ∆ or Σ. Then the Ξ-topology on S I (T ) is the one generated by { ϕ : ϕ(x ∈I ) ∈ Ξ} as closed sets. Take for the standard topology on S I (T ) the Σ-topology. We call S I (T ) with the Σ-topology the space of (complete pure) I-types of T .
2. T is semi-Hausdorff if for every n, the set {tp ( we say that equality of types is definable by a partial type, that is by an infinite conjunction).
2 be the obvious map (just send tp(ā,b) to (tp(ā), tp(b))), and let D(S n (T )) = {(p, p) : p ∈ S n (T )} ⊆ S n (T ) 2 be the diagonal. Then T is Hausdorff if and only if every D(S n (T )) is closed, and it is semi-Hausdorff if and only if every π 1. T is complete. 2. Whenever T implies the disjunction of two Π-sentences, it implies at least one of them.
Proof.
1 =⇒ 2: Clear. 2 =⇒ 3: Assume that p, q ∈ S 0 (T ) are different. Then they are incomparable, and by a compactness argument we find Σ-sentences ϕ ∈ p and ψ ∈ q such that T ∪ {ϕ, ψ} is inconsistent. This means that T ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ, whereby by hypothesis T ¬ϕ or T ¬ψ, contradicting the assumption that p and q were types. 3 =⇒ 4: Let M ∈ M(T ). Then M |= T so T ⊆ Th Π (M ). For the converse, assume that T Th Π (M ), so there is a Σ-sentence ϕ such that M |= ¬ϕ but T ∪ {ϕ} are consistent. Then we can find N |= T where ϕ holds, and we can continue N to some N ∈ M, so N |= ϕ as well. Then the types of the empty tuples in M and N are different, contradicting | S 0 (T )| = 1. 4 =⇒ 5 =⇒ 1: Clear. qed Corollary 1.45. 1. The completions of T are precisely the theories of e.c. models of T . 2. If f : M → N is a morphism between two e.c. models of T then their theories are equal:
Proof. 1. If T is a completion of T , it is complete, that is T = Th Π (M ) for some M . Then M |= T so we can continue M to an e.c. model M of T . We obtain:
Conversely, Let M be an e.c. model of T , and T = Th Π (M ). Then T is complete. Suppose that T ⊆ T ⊆ T and T is complete as well. Then M is a fortiori e.c. as a model of T , thus T = Th Π (M ) = T as T is complete. This shows the minimality of T .
2. In such a case we have that Th Π (M ) ⊇ Th Π (N ) are both completions of T , and by minimality of completion we have equality. qed
, and the map c : p → T p is a bijection between S 0 (T ) and the completions of T .
Proof. Assume that M, M ∈ M p (T ) for some p ∈ S 0 (T ). Then by Lemma 1.37, there is N ∈ M(T ) that continues both M and M , and by Corollary 1.45 we have Th
) is a completion of T , and the map c : S 0 (T ) → {completions of T } is well defined. If T is a completion of T , then T = Th Π (M ) for some M ∈ M(T ), and let p = tp M (∅). Then by the above, T = Th Π (M ) = T p , so c is surjective. Finally, if p, q ∈ S 0 (T ) are distinct, then there is a Σ-sentence ϕ ∈ p q, so ¬ϕ ∈ T q but ¬ϕ / ∈ T p , whereby T p = T q and c is surjective. If M ∈ M p (T ), then it is an e.c. model of T and therefore a fortiori of Th Π (M ) = T p , so M ∈ M(T p ). Conversely, assume that M ∈ M(T p ), and we want to show that M ∈ M(T ). Since T p is complete we have Th Π (M ) = T p . Let f : M → N be a morphism with N |= T , and we need to show that it is a Σ-embedding. We may assume that N ∈ M(T ), whereby Th Π (N ) ⊆ T p are both completions of T and therefore equal. Since M ∈ M(T p ), f is a Σ-embedding, which shows that M ∈ M(T ). Since every q ∈ S 0 (T ) different from p contradicts T p , we must actually have M ∈ M p (T ). qed Corollary 1.47. Every complete theory containing T contains a completion of T .
Proof. Assume that T = Th Π (M ) and T ⊆ T . Then M |= T , and we can continue it to N ∈ M(T ): Th Π (N ) is a completion of T and Th Π (N ) ⊆ T . qed Example 1.48. Set ∆ = L ω,ω and T = ∅. As a set, the completions of T are all the complete first order theories in the language L, and topology on S 0 (T ) is the classical Stone topology on this set.
Cats
We are going to define three objects of very different nature, that turn out to be manifestations of the same concept, which we call a compact abstract theory, or a cat.
Positive Robinson theories.
In various contexts of model theory, assuming quantifier elimination is useful as a starting point, and in abstract contexts does not cost much. In our context, this will be the assumption that ∆ has the same power of expression as Σ: Definition 2.1. A Π-theory T is a positive Robinson theory if whenever M i ∈ M(T ) and a ∈ M I i for i < 2 and tp ∆ (a 0 ) ⊆ tp ∆ (a 1 ) then tp(a 0 ) = tp(a 1 ) (that is, tp Σ (a 0 ) = tp Σ (a 1 )). In other words, a ∆-type determines a Σ-type. Therefore from now on, every formula is in ∆, unless explicitly said otherwise. If we want to consider a Σ-formula we will call it so and use the existential quantifier explicitly.
In other words, an L-structure M is an e.c. model of T if and only if, for every ϕ(x, y) and tuple a ∈ M of the same length as x, M |= ∃y ϕ(a, y) if and only if M |= ψ(a) whenever according to T , ψ(a) forbids ϕ(a, y). Informally, we would say that something exists in M if and only if there is no reason for it not to exist. 4. Whenever T ¬ i<λ ϕ i (x, y i ) (namely, the set {ϕ i (x, y i ) : i < λ} is inconsistent with T ), then there exist infinitary disjunctions Ψ i (x) such that M |= Ψ i (meaning that each Ψ i is a set of formulas ψ(x), and if M ∈ M and a ∈ M is of the right length, then M |= ψ(a) for some ψ ∈ Ψ i ) and for all i and ψ ∈ Ψ i : T ¬∃x, y i ψ(x) ∧ ϕ i (x, y i ). 5. As above, for x finite and λ = 2.
Proof.
1 =⇒ 2: Clear. 2 =⇒ 3: First, we show that these sentence are all true in M: The → part is clear. As for the other direction, let M ∈ M, M |= ¬∃y ϕ(a, y), and write p(x) = tp ∆ (a). Then T ∪ p(x) ∪ ϕ(x, y) is contradictory: if not, there would be M |= T with a , b ∈ M satisfying p(x) ∪ ϕ(x, y), so by the assumption and Lemma 1.37 there is N and morphisms f : M → N , f : M → N , and f (a) = f (a ). But then M |= ∃y ϕ(f (a), y), contradicting the assumption on a and the fact that M was e.c.. Thus, there is some ψ such that T ¬∃x, y ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x, y), and M |= ψ(a). Thus we have shown that M satisfies all these axioms. Conversely, suppose that M satisfies them all. Then M satisfies T , for if ¬∃y ϕ(y) ∈ T , then T ¬∃y ∧ ϕ(y), thus we get the axiom ∃y ϕ(y) ↔ ⊥, that is ¬∃y ϕ(y) (if one does not like this, one can always add T to the list of axioms). Now, the fact that M is e.c. is evident: if f : M → N is a morphism and N |= ∃y ϕ(f (a), y), then all that contradicts it is false in N , therefore false in M , wherefore M |= ∃y ϕ(a, y) as well.
3 =⇒ 4: Note that by compactness we can easily reduce to the case where λ < ω, but this is unnecessary. Let Ψ i (x) = {ψ(x) : T ¬∃x, y ψ(x)∧ϕ i (x, y i )}. Then, by the assumption, they satisfy the conditions. 4 =⇒ 5: Clear. 5 =⇒ 1: Let M i ∈ M and a i ∈ M I i for i < 2, and assume that tp ∆ (a 0 ) = tp ∆ (a 1 ). We need to show that tp Σ (a 0 ) = tp Σ (a 1 
1 =⇒ 2:
, where x is an n-tuple. By Lemma 1.39, K i is the image of ϕ i under a continuous map, and therefore compact in the ∆-topology. The hypothesis also says that i<λ K i = ∅, so we may apply Fact 2.9 to obtain open U i ⊇ K i such that i<λ U i = ∅, and by the moreover part we may assume that each U i = ¬ψ i for some formula ψ i . Then Definition 2.11. 1. A structure M is homogeneous if whenever f : M → M is a partial endomorphism with a small domain, f extends to an automorphism. 2. A structure M is compact if any small set of formulas over M in possibly infinitely many variables, which is finitely realised in M , is realised in M . 3. A structure M is a universal domain (for Th Π (M )) if it is homogeneous and compact.
This is clear:
Lemma 2.12. 1. A universal domain is e.c..
2.
If U is a universal domain for T and M is a small model of T , then M can be sent ∆-homomorphically into U . 3. Above, if M ∈ M, then this ∆-homomorphism is a ∆-embedding.
As in [Hru97] , we wish to show the correspondence between complete positive Robinson theories and universal domains.
One should note first that if T is positive Robinson then every completion of T is positive Robinson: if T is a completion of T , then any complete pure type of T is such for T , and therefore equivalent to a ∆-type. Such properties as strong positive Robinson, Hausdorff, semi-Hausdorff, etc., are easily verified to be also preserved under completion.
Then we prove the correspondence:
Theorem 2.13. A complete Π-theory T is positive Robinson if and only if it has some universal domain U .
Proof. =⇒: 1. As T is positive Robinson, a partial endomorphism of an e.c. model of T is a partial isomorphism, and in particular invertible. Thus one can amalgamate the model with itself over the endomorphism in both directions, thus obtaining a larger model with an endomorphism extending the original, whose domain and range contain the original model. As the original model was e.c., this endomorphism passes to an e.c. continuation. Repeating this process ω times we get an e.c. continuation on which the endomorphism extends to an automorphism. Note that being an e.c. model of T is stable for increasing unions. 2. Now, if we are given given a model M , and ≤ λ partial endomorphisms of M , we can do the same thing: we do the fundamental step for each endomorphism, and repeat this procedure ω times. Note that the endomorphisms pass to the continuations, as they were originally on e.c. models. If λ ≥ |M | + |T |, the resulting model can be taken to be of cardinality λ. 3. Choose some λ, κ with λ κ = λ ≥ |T |, and some M with Th Π (M ) = T and |M | ≤ λ. One can continue M to be e.c., of cardinality exactly λ. Over M there are at most λ partial types (i.e., subsets of complete types) with at most κ formulas, and at most λ partial endomorphisms whose domain is of cardinality at most κ. Thus one can extend all these to automorphisms and realise the partial types in some e.c. continuation of cardinality λ. Repeat this κ + times, at each step also extending automorphisms already created on the previous ones (we always have at most λ), to obtain a κ + -universal domain for T continuing M , of cardinality λ. ⇐=: Say that M, N ∈ M,ā ∈ M ,b ∈ N , and tp ∆ (ā) ⊆ tp ∆ (b). By compactness, we can send M, N into U by morphisms. As M is e.c., it is in fact embedded into U , and the mapā →b is a partial endomorphism of U . We finish using homogeneity. qed
We finish with a few examples.
Example 2.14. As we said before, if ∆ is closed for negation then a positive Robinson theory is a classical Robinson theory, and if ∆ = L ω,ω every theory is a first order theory.
Example 2.15. If ∆ = Σ(∆), then every theory is strongly positive Robinson. As noted before, replacing ∆ with Σ(∆) does not change Σ(∆), Π(∆) or the notion of a morphism, so we may always assume we deal with a strongly positive Robinson theory. In particular, if ∆ is the closure of ∆ 0 for negation, then working in M ∆ gives the context described in [Pil00] , where every theory is strongly positive Robinson with respect to ∆ = Σ(∆).
Example 2.16. Let U be a universal domain for T , and E(x, y) a type-definable equivalence relation on tuples of length α. The elements of U α /E are called hyperimaginaries, and we wish to add them to the structure as ordinary elements (of a new sort). For each formula ϕ(z, x 1 . . . x k ) ∈ ∆, with each x i of length α (of course, only finitely many variables actually appear), add a symbol R ϕ of arity |z| in the first sort, and k in the second, and interpret it on U as: R ϕ (a,b) if and only if ∃x ∈b ϕ(a,x). Let ∆ be the positive fragment generated by ∆ and atomic formulas in the new predicate symbols. One verifies that U is a universal domain for ∆ . Moreover, if U is Hausdorff, so is U . Equality for the sort of U is in the ∆ , but not necessarily inequality, as it is for hyperimaginaries in first-order theories. One can similarly add several hyperimaginary sorts in one blow.
Example 2.17. Let U be a universal domain for a multi-sorted language. Let U be the structure obtained by replacing the sorts with unary predicates. Then U is also a universal domain. As a consequence, we obtain: Let T be a positive Robinson theory in a multi-sorted language L. Let L be the language obtained by abolishing the sorts, adding unary predicates in their stead. Let T be the natural image of T in L , with the addition of ¬(ϕ(x) ∧ P s (x i )) whenever ϕ ∈ ∆, S = S are two different sorts, and x i would be of the sort S in L. Then T is a positive Robinson theory (with ∆ being the image of ∆ with the addition of the sort-predicates).
Compact type-space functors.
We define (compact) type-space functors. These are very close to the f-spaces from [Hru97] , although we use them for different ends. We show the equivalence between compact type-space functors and positive Robinson theories, namely that they are precisely the type-space functors of the those theories.
Definition 2.18. 1. We let Set be the category of sets, F Set that of finite sets, and T that of topological spaces. We also define T 1 as the category of T 1 topological spaces with continuous closed maps as morphisms, and T c 1 ⊆ T 1 as the full subcategory consisting of compact spaces. 2. Let S ∈ Funct(F Set op , C), where C ∈ {Set, T }. We extend it toS ∈ Funct(Set op , C) by taking inverse limits. In other words, for a set a, definẽ S = lim ← − a ∈P f in (a) S(a ). Clearly,S extends S. For a ∈ Set, we write S a =S(a). If f ∈ Hom Set (a, b) and S is clear from the context, we write f
In case that S ∈ Funct(F Set op , T ) and T ⊆ T is a sub-category, we say that S (resp.S) factors through T if it factors through the inclusion T → T . 4. Let f eq : 2 → 1 be the only possible map, and note eq = f * eq (S 1 ) ⊆ S 2 . Then S is equality-preserving if for every a ∈ F Set and h : 2 → a, if one notes b = a/{h(0) = h(1)} and f : a → b the projection, then f * (S b ) = h * (eq). 5. S has the (finite) amalgamation property if for every two (finite) sets a and b, the natural map S a∪b → S a × S a∩b S b is surjective. 6. A type-space functor is a functor S : F Set op → C which is equality-preserving and has the amalgamation property, and C ∈ {Set, T }.
S is a set type-space functor if C = Set; it is a topological type-space functor if C = T andS factors through T 1 ; it is a compact type-space functor if C = T and S factors through T c 1 . Note that we requireS, and not only S, to factor through T 1 and T c 1 , respectively. 7. A finite type-space functor is a functor S : F Set op → C which is equalitypreserving and has the finite amalgamation property, and C ∈ {Set, T }. S is a finite set type-space functor if C = Set; it is a finite topological type-space functor if C = T and S factors through T 1 ; it is a finite compact type-space functor if C = T and S factors through T c 1 . In this definition we just replaced each requirement of the previous one with its finite analogue.
Remark 2.19. 1. The equality-preservation condition can be considered as an amalgamation condition. Indeed, with the notation of the definition, let h : 1 → b,
Then b is the direct limit of (f eq : 2 → 1, h : 2 → a), and h * (eq) is the inverse limit of (f * eq : S 1 → S 2 , h * : S a → S 2 ). Then we obtain f * : S b → h * (eq), and we require this to be surjective. 2. We defined type-space functors for a single sort. For multiple (say λ) sorts, one should replace Set and F Set with the categories of (finite) sets coloured in λ colours, and modify the definitions appropriately.
Intuitively, the set S a is supposed to represent the set of types of a-tuples x a = x i : i ∈ a in the models of some theory. Clearly, if f : a → b is a map and the type of x i : i ∈ b is known, then so is that of x f (i) : i ∈ a , as it is merely a sub-tuple, possibly with repetitions. Thus we obtain the map f * : S b → S a . Note that in the particular case where f is injective, the effect of f * is just taking the type of a subtuple, and should be surjective, whereas when f is surjective, f * gives the types of tuples with duplicate elements, that is the sub-space corresponding to the conjunction of some equality relations. The equality-preservation condition says that the meaning of equality is sane: two elements of an a-tuple are equal if and only if they are equal as a 2-tuple. The amalgamation condition is straightforward: types which coincide on a sub-tuple can be amalgamated. Finally, the topology: we understand closed sets as definable by some possibly infinite conjunction. The T 1 requirement means that every type can be expressed in the language; the compactness is just that; the continuousness of the maps corresponds standard manipulations of the free variables of a formula: using the same variable several times, or adding dummy variables, to render it in another tuple of free variables; and finally the closedness requirement of the maps f * corresponds both to the application of the existential quantifier (where f is the inclusion of the sub-tuple on which we do not quantify) and to the definability of equality (for example, when f : 2 → 1, then f * (S 1 ) ⊆ S 2 is the closed set corresponding to the formula x 0 = x 1 ). The modifications of the above needed when considering multiple sorts should be obvious.
As usual in model theory, equality needs a somewhat special treatment. In this context, this means we need to understand the map f * , when f is surjective.
Lemma 2.20. Let S be a type-space functor.
1. If a map f : a → b is surjective (injective) then f * is injective (surjective). 2. Let f : a → b be surjective. Assume that a = b ∪ c and f is the identity on b, and let g : b → a be the inclusion. Then f
Continuing with the previous notations and assumptions, we have a strong version of equality-preservation:
Then f * (S b ) = i∈c h i * (eq) (in other words, many equalities hold at the same time if and only if each one holds separately).
Proof. 1. If f is surjective, then there is (an injective) g :
Until now, we only used the fact that S was a functor. 3. Assume at first that a is finite, so so is b. We prove this by induction on |c|. When |c| = 0, there is nothing to show. So take i ∈ c, and write b = a {i}, c = c {i}, and define f : a → b as the identity on b and f on {i}, and f = f b . Then f = f • f . By the induction hypothesis and equality-preservation:
Thus:
as required. For an infinite a, we prove each inclusion separately. For the first, take any i ∈ c, repeat the construction above, and define also h : 1 → b by
For the other inclusion, take x ∈ i∈c h i * (eq), and we wish to prove that x ∈ f * (S b ). Take g : b → a as above, and we will show that x = f * (g * (x)). By the definition of S a as an inverse limit, it suffice to prove that for every finiteã ⊆ a there is a finiteã ⊆ã ⊆ a such that π * (x) = π * (f * (g * (x))), where π :ã → a is the inclusion. So givenã ⊆ a we replace it withã =ã ∪ f (ã ), so that f (ã) ⊆ã. Writeb = b ∩ã,c = c ∩ã, sõ a =b ∪c, and letf :ã →b,g :b →ã andh i : 2 →ã for i ∈c be the obvious restrictions. Then we have reduced to the finite case andf * (Sb) = i∈ch i * (eq). On the other hand, g • f • π = π •g •f , and h i = π •h i for i ∈c. Then for i ∈ c we have π In other words, with the presence of compactness, the finitary versions of the requirements from a compact type-space functor imply the infinitary ones.
Proof. Clearly, S κ is T 1 for every κ. We now verify that S κ is compact for every infinite κ, and that for injective f : α → β, f * is closed. We do this by induction on κ, assuming |β| ≤ κ. Write S κ = lim ← − i<κ S i . Then by the assumption S i are all compact, and the projection f * ij : S j → S i is closed for every i ≤ j < κ. Let {C γ : γ ∈ Γ} be closed subsets of S κ having the finite intersection property. We may assume that they are closed for finite intersection. By the definition of the topology on S κ , each C γ can be written as i<κ f i * (C γ,i ) where f i : i → κ are the injections, and C γ,i ⊆ S i are closed subsets. We claim that we may assume that f * ij (C γ,j ) = C γ,i for every i < j < κ. Indeed, we can replace C γ,i with C γ,i ∩ f * ij (C γ,j ), and C γ,j with C γ,j ∩ f ij * (C γ,i ): these sets are closed as f * ij is continuous and closed, and the changes do not influence C γ . Iterating until the process stabilises, we obtain the required property. As a consequence we also have f *
is clear, and for every x i ∈ C γ,i we can construct a branch above it of x j ∈ C γ,j , and its limit is in C γ . By induction on i, choose x i ∈ γ C γ,i such that x i = f * ij (x j ) for i < j. As S 0 is compact, just choose some x 0 ∈ C γ,0 . For a limit i, the sequence x j : j < i fixes x i completely, and one sees it has to be in each C γ,i = j<i f ji * (C γ,j ). For i = j + 1, we want to show that {C γ,i : γ ∈ Γ} ∪ {f ji * (x j )} has the finite intersection property. Note first that
for some γ, as {C γ } is closed for finite intersection. Thus it suffices to show that C γ,i ∩ f ji * (x j ) = ∅ for every γ. However, this is equivalent to x j ∈ f * ji (C γ,i ) = C γ,j , which is true. Thus we may choose x i ∈ f ji * (x j )∩ C γ,i , and continue the construction. The sequence x i : i < κ fixes an element in S κ , which is clearly in C γ , and we proved that S κ is compact. Assume now that f : a → κ is an inclusion, and we want to show that f * is closed. In fact, if a is bounded in κ, then we have already shown this. In the general case, we obtain a "ladder", where on one side we have S i : i ≤ κ and on the other S i∩a : i ≤ κ. We know by the induction hypothesis on κ that for every i < κ, the map f * i : S i → S i∩a is closed. We also note the following inclusions: g ij : i → j and h ij : i ∩ a → j ∩ a, and when there is an index κ we allow ourselves to omit it (except for S κ ). Let C ⊆ S κ be closed, and we want to prove that f
). For i < κ, C i is closed as i ⊆ κ is bounded, and D i is closed as |i| < κ. We claim that D = i<κ h i * (D i ). Indeed, we clearly have D ⊆ h i * (D i ). On the other hand, let x ∈ i<κ h i * (D i ), and let
. This means that f * (y) = x, and we are done. This concludes the proof that S κ is compact for all κ, and that f * is closed for every injective f . The infinitary amalgamation property is proved in a similar manner using compactness. When f : a → b is surjective and C ⊆ S b is closed, then following notations and conventions of Lemma 2.20 we have f * (C) = f * (S b ) ∩ g * (C) = i∈c h i * (eq) ∩ g * (C) which is closed, concluding the proof. qed Question 2.22. Is a finite set type-space functor a set type-space functor? In other words, does the finite amalgamation property implies the full one?
We can now characterise positive Robinson theories as precisely those who have compact type-spaces. On the one hand, S(T ) is a compact type-space functor (see Lemma 1.39). Conversely, we have:
Theorem 2.23. There is an operation Th pos that associates canonically to every compact type-space functor S a strongly positive Robinson theory Th pos (S), such that S(Th pos (S)) ∼ = S.
Proof. We start with S, and we try to obtain a positive Robinson theory T = Th pos (S). We take L n = {P R : R ⊆ S n is closed} and L = L n , where the elements of L n are considered as n-ary predicates, and ∆ = ∆ 0 . For every k, n ∈ ω,n ∈ ω k , maps f i : n i → n and P R i ∈ L n i for i < k, consider i<k f i * (R i ). If it is empty, then T contains the sentence
and T contains only sentences obtained in this way. Then T is an Π 1 -theory, and it is consistent as any L-structure not satisfying any relations is a model of T . Let M be an e.c. model T , and write M = {a i : i < κ}. Consider the intersection:
This is an intersection of closed sets of S κ , and each finite sub-intersection is non-empty, as T would forbid otherwise. Therefore C = ∅, and we may choose some element p ∈ C. Define now a structure M , over the same base set, such that M |= P R (f * (ā)) if and only if p ∈ f * (R) for every m < ω, f : m → κ and P R ∈ L m . Then M |= T is a continuation of M , and as M is e.c. they must be equal. This means in particular that C = {p}, so it would make sense to define tp S (M ) = tp S (a <κ ) = p, and similarly, for every f : n → κ we can define tp
, there is still one predicate to deal with: equality. So let h : 2 → κ be 0 → i, 1 → j, and we want to prove that M |= P eq (a i , a j ) if and only if a i = a j . One direction is clear. For the other, assume that M |= P eq (a i , a j ) and i = j. So let κ = κ {j}, and let g : κ → κ send j to i and be the identity elsewhere. Then tp S (M ) ∈ h * (eq) = g * (S κ ), say tp S (M ) = g * (q). Construct M on a base set {a k : k ∈ κ } from q as we did M from p, and let
, so ϕ is a homomorphism (in fact, but for equality, we have shown it to be an isomorphism), and M |= ϕ(a i ) = ϕ(a j ). As M is e.c., we must have had a i = a j to begin with, contradicting i = j.
We prove that S(T )
S by sending tp(b) (for some M ∈ M(T ) andb ∈ M n ) to tp S (b). This map is necessarily surjective, and we wish to show that it is injective. Let M i ∈ M(T ),b i ∈ M n for i < 2, and assume that tp S (b 0 ) = tp S (b 1 ) = q ∈ S n . Since q determines equality we may assume that bothb i are without repetition. By the amalgamation property of S we can amalgamate tp S (M 0 ) and tp S (M 1 ) over q, and realise it in some model N |= T . Since tp S (−) determines tp ∆ 0 (−), we obtain ∆ 0 -homomorphisms
Finally, the ∆ 0 -topology clearly coincides with the original topology on S, in which every f * is closed. Therefore T is strongly positive Robinson. qed
We can characterise the classical subdivisions:
Theorem 2.24. There is an operation Th that associates canonically to a totally disconnected compact type-space functor S a classical Robinson theory (i.e., with negation) Th(S), such that S(Th(S)) ∼ = S. Moreover, Th(S) is first-order (i.e., has a first-order model completion) if and only if S is open as well (i.e., f * are open maps).
Proof. In the proof above, taking the language to be a base for the closed sets would have sufficed. If S is totally disconnected and compact, then the clopen sets form such a base. So take it as the language L, let ∆ be the set of all quantifier-free formulas, and ∆ 0 ⊆ ∆ the set of all positive ones. Let T be Th pos (S) restricted to L: it is a positive Robinson Π 1 -theory and S(T ) S. Moreover, in M(T ), every ∆-formula is equivalent to a ∆ 0 -formula, so up to obvious identifications we have ∆ 0 = ∆
QE(∆) 0
, and in can apply Proposition 1.33: in particular, if T 0 = Th Π(∆) (M(T )), then M(T ) = M(T 0 ), and T 0 is a classical Robinson theory. For the moreover part, we know that the type-space functor of a first order theory is clopen. For the converse, assume that S above is also open. Then f * (R) is clopen for every clopen R, thus the positive quantifier-free formulas are also closed for quantification, and in fact give all of L ω,ω . We can therefore apply the above argument (and in particular Proposition 1.33) with ∆ = L ω,ω . qed 2.3. Compact abstract elementary categories. Here we give yet another equivalent description of positive Robinson theories (and a method for obtaining such). We show that abstract elementary classes with amalgamation and locality of types, or a slight variant thereof, satisfying in addition a (weak) version of compactness, are indeed equivalent in a sense to positive Robinson theories (by "equivalent" we mean "having the same type-spaces"). Using this method, we can show that Hilbert and Banach spaces are such.
Convention 2.25. In order to put this section in the context of ZF C, a few remarks are required:
1. We shall consider many equivalence relations for which the equivalence classes are proper classes. Therefore we represent each equivalence class by the set of all its members of minimal foundation rank in this class. 2. The objects of a category may form a proper class, though the morphisms between each pair are always a set. If obj(C) is a set, we say that C is a set category, otherwise we say that it is a proper class category. 3. If C, C are categories, then a functor from C to C is a class. if C is a set category, then such a functor is a set, and it makes sense to speak of the category Funct(C, C ) (which is a set if and only if C is).
Definition 2.26. Let C a category equipped with a functor | · | to the category of sets. Then C (or more precisely, (C, | · |)) is a concrete category if:
1. Whenever A, B ∈ C, and f : |A| → |B| is a function, there is at most one g ∈ Hom C (A, B) such that f = |g| (in other words, | · | is a faithful functor). In case g exists, we say that f is a morphism and identify it with g. 2. Whenever A ∈ C, X is a set, and f : |A| → X is a bijection, there is a unique f (A) = B ∈ C, such that X = |B| and f ∈ Hom C (A, B).
A functor of concrete categories a functor F :
Definition 2.27. Let M be a concrete category. Call its objects models, and its morphisms elementary embeddings. Write M M N if M ⊆ N and the inclusion is a morphism. Then M is an elementary category with amalgamation if it satisfies the following:
Injectiveness: All morphisms are injective (on the underlying sets). Tarski-Vaught property:
Elementary chain property: A M -chain M i is bounded from above, i.e. there a structure N with M i M N for all i. If both N 0 , N 1 have this property, then there is P ∈ M and f i ∈ Hom M (N i , P ) which are the same on |M i |. Amalgamation: Whenever f i ∈ Hom M (M, N i ) for i < 2, there are P ∈ M and
Remark 2.28. Shelah's definition of an abstract elementary class (as can be found, in [She99] ) does not include amalgamation, but requires more structure on the class itself. We omit these structure requirements, as we do not need them and they may just cause confusion with the structure that we shall put on the class later on. In any case, everything said here for elementary categories with amalgamation holds full well for abstract elementary classes with amalgamation, so the difference is not essential. Note that the second clause in the definition of the elementary chain property just says that tp N 0 ( |M i |) = tp N 1 ( |M i |) (see below), so if we ever wish to remove the amalgamation hypothesis it will make sense to weaken this clause accordingly. In order to do first-order-like manipulation, we still need a few axioms:
Definition 2.32. We say that an elementary category is compact if in addition it satisfies:
Type boundedness: For all n ≤ ω, S n (M) is a set. Remark 2.33. We call this weak compactness, as it corresponds to the compactness of a somewhat poor topology, namely the minimal topology rendering S(M) a finite topological type-space functor (see below).
Remark 2.34. The following weaker version of compactness holds in any elementary category with type-locality: Let I be a set, I ⊆ P(I), x I an infinite tuple indexed by I, and {p J (x J ) ∈ S J (M) : J ∈ I} a set of (representatives of) pure types in sub-tuples of x I , such that (I, ⊆) is directed, and whenever J, J ∈ I and J ⊆ J , then p J (x J ) p J (x J ) in the obvious sense (in the type-space functor terminology, if f : J → J is the inclusion, then f * (p J ) = p J ). Then there is M ∈ M and a I ∈ M such that tp M (a J ) = p J for all J ∈ I.
Proof. We prove this by induction on κ = |I|. For finite κ this is clear, so we may assume it is infinite. We reduce easily to the case where I = P f in (I). We may of course assume that I = κ as sets. We construct by induction on i < κ a M -chain M i and choose a i ∈ M i+1 that realise the proper types, in the following manner:
1. i = 0: Take M 0 to be any model that realises p ∅ . 2. i limit: Take M i to be some M -bound for M j : j < i . 3. i = j + 1: We already have constructed a <j , and want to construct a j . By the hypothesis of the induction on κ, as |i| < κ there is some model M and b <i ∈ M that realise all p J for J ∈ P f in (i). By type locality, tp M (b <j ) = tp M j (a <j ), so we may take M i to witness (M j , a <j ) ≡ (M , b <j ). We may assume that M i M M j , and take a j to be the image of b j in M i . Now taking a bound for the entire sequence M i , we obtain the result. qed
We connect this with previous definitions: Proof. The first assertion should be clear, using Remark 2.34, so we prove the second. Just during this proof, call a topology rendering S(M) a finite topological type-space functor good, and note that this property does not involve any S α (M) for infinite α. The discrete topology on S(M) (that is, on S n (M) for every n < ω) is clearly good, and the intersection of good topologies is also good. Thus a minimal good topology exists, as the intersection of all good topologies. On the other hand, the minimal good topology can be constructed by starting with the co-finite topology on every S n , and adding at each step all images and inverse images of closed sets by every f * , and taking the generated topology. Iterating this would give the minimal good topology. We now note that in the definition of weak compactness we could have added existential quantifiers, equality, finite disjunction and infinite conjunction at no additional costs: an existential quantifier can be disposed of, making sure that the quantified variables are new, and instead of saying x = y, we can just replace all the occurrences of y with x. Finite disjunction and infinite conjunction are disposed of easily in standard ways so we reduce to the original compactness property. Assume now that M satisfies weak compactness, and put on S(M) the topology where the closed sets on S n (M) are defined by formulas with n free variables, generated from the type-predicates and equality by finite disjunction, infinite conjunction and existential quantification. Then this topology is clearly good, and by the previous argument it is also compact. Conversely, assume that the minimal good topology on S(M) is compact. Then by Corollary 2.21, S(M) is a compact type-space functor. This implies that S κ is compact for every κ, so weak compactness holds. qed Remark 2.36. It is important to point out that if M is compact, then S(M) comes already with one intrinsic compact topology, namely the minimal one rendering it a topological type-space functor. Given any specific M, one may point out richer topologies that are still compact (and we will do so in the examples we give), but one does not have to: the minimal one will always suffice. This means that in what follows, a minimal (and very poor) language can always be deduced directly from the pair (M, | · |), without any language appearing explicitly in the input.
We thus obtain: 
Proof. Take T = Th pos (S(M)), and F the natural interpretation of M ∈ M as an L-structure. Then:
1. The second assertion is already known. As for the first, it suffices to show that T ¬∃x R i (x f i ) if and only if M |= ¬∃x R i (x f i ), where where R i are n i -ary relations, and f i : n i → n give the relevant sub-tuple. Clearly, both are equivalent
M can be continued to a F (N ) for N ∈ M. As F (N ) |= T and M is e.c., this is an embedding and M ⊆ L F (N ). 4. As F (M ) |= T by definition, we can continue F (M ) to an e.c. model N of T .
As every finite tuple from F (M ) satisfies precisely one predicate, and every finite tuple in N satisfies at most one predicate (T would forbid more), we see that 2.4. Examples. We start with a simple example, of an elementary abstract category with type-locality (that is, of a set type-space functor) which is not compact. Consider first the category C of bipartite graphs. So a model M ∈ C is a disjoint union U M ∪ V M , and there is also the graph R M ⊆ U M × V M , and Hom C (M, N ) is the set of embeddings of M into N . It is easily verified that C is a compact elementary category, and S n (C) is finite for every n < ω. Thus we recover from the category structure an ω-categorical first-order theory, that of the generic bipartite graph.
For
In order to add structure to C, we consider the sub-category C where the objects are the same, but morphisms are now required to preserve acl. Thus, working in C , we do not need to specify in which model we take the acl. One verifies that C is an elementary category (with amalgamation). We claim then that for a set A, tp(A) is just the ismorphism class of acl(A) (as a bipartite graph, over A). This is clear, as A ⊆ M implies that acl(A) ≤ C M , so just apply amalgamation. This shows type locality and boundedness. In particular, this means that S 2 (C) contains the following types: x = y ∈ U , x = y ∈ V , x R y, y R x, ¬(x R y) ¬(y R x) (in the last two we unterstand implicitly that the left-hand side is in U and the right-hand in V ), x = y ∈ V , and for α ∈ ω ∪ {∞}: x = y ∈ U ∧ |R(x) ∩ R(y)| = α. It can be verified that C is also compact.
Our goal however is C ⊆ C , which is the full sub-category consisting of all objects M ∈ C such that |R M (a) ∩ R M (a )| < ω for all a = a ∈ U M . Then everything we said about C holds, except the following: the 2-type x = y ∈ U ∧ |R(x) ∩ R(y)| = ∞ no longer exists, and compactness is lost. Indeed, the following set is finitely consistent but not consistent:
{xRz i : i < ω} ∪ {yRz i : i < ω} ∪ {z i = z j ∈ V : i < j < ω} ∪ {xRw, ¬(yRw)} So in a sense, C is a compactification of C .
We continue with very natural examples, Hilbert and Banach spaces. Note that similar examples exist also in [BL00] .
Example 2.39. Let F be R or C. Then category B of normed vector spaces over F, with isometries as morphisms, is a connected compact elementary category, and the sub-category H of inner product spaces is a connected compact elementary subcategory. In both, two tuples have the same type if and only if there is an isometry of the subspaces they generate sending one onto the other.
Proof. We give the proof for B, unless where it is different for H . This is clearly a concrete category. Let us verify that it is elementary:
Injectiveness: Isometries are injective. Tarski We have yet to show that this is compact:
Type boundedness: Clear. Type locality: If a, b are infinite tuples, and every two corresponding finite subtuples have the same type, then we have an isomorphism of the vector spaces generated by a and b sending a onto b. But then it preserves norms as well. Weak compactness for Banach spaces: We shall prove a stronger result, that is the compactness of a space with a richer topology (or language). For every n < ω,λ ∈ F n and K ⊆ R + compact, we define the n-ary predicate p B n,λ,K by:
and we take L B to be the set of all such predicates. First, every complete ntype is the conjunction of (infinitely many) such predicates, so it suffices to show compactness in this language. We claim then that if Σ(x) is a set of positive quantifier-free formulas in this language in some infinite tuple of variables, and it is finitely realized in B, then it is realized in B: First, we may clearly assume that Σ is in fact a set of predicates. Let V = Fx i the space of linear combinations inx, and let W ⊆ V be the subspace generated by those linear combinations which are present in the predicates which appear in Σ. Choose a basisȳ for W , and find W such that V = W ⊕ W as vector Remark 2.41. With the languages we gave for B and H , they are not Hausdorff, nor indeed semi-Hausdorff. In fact, not only is the language for B not semi-Hausdorff, but we also cannot expand it to be (while keeping compactness). Indeed, if we add predicates for type equality, then the set {x i ≡ x i+1 : i < ω} ∪ { x i+1 − x i = i : i < ω} is finitely realised but not realised.
Remark 2.42. Replace the language we gave for B with the somewhat weaker language consisting of the predicates: q B n,λ,X,N (x) ⇐⇒ i<n λ i x i ∈ X ∧ i<n x i ≤ N and add predicates for equality of types. Then S(B) is compact with the induced topology, and in particular B is semi-Hausdorff in this language. Indeed, assume we are given a finitely consistent set Σ of predicates in this language. Then we have two kinds of predicates: norm predicates and type-equality predicates. The norm predicates (in the modified language) give us bounds on the norm of every variable they apply to. Then, if we have a bound on x and we know that x ≡ y then we also have a bound on y . Let x i : i < λ be the variables on whose norms we have bounds, and x i : i < λ the others. Let W , W be the spaces of linear combinations of these sets of variables respectively, and V = W ⊕ W . For every finite Σ 0 ⊆ Σ we have a semi-norm ρ on V such that (V, ρ) |= Σ 0 . Define ρ (w + w ) = ρ(w) (where w + w is the decomposition of v ∈ V = W ⊕ W ). One verifies that then (V, ρ ) |= Σ 0 . This means that Σ = Σ ∪ { x i = 0 : i < λ } is also finitely consistent, and now we have bounds on all the variables. We can then replace the type-equality conditions, which are closed, by compact ones and reduce to the language we gave in the beginning. A similar argument shows that we can add type-equality predicates to the language we gave for H preserving compactness. Thus, when needed, both B and H can be assumed to be semi-Hausdorff.
